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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 18-2009 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
COURTNEY JOHNSON, 
                                 Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-13-cr-00417-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 21, 2019 
 
Before:  AMBRO, RESTREPO and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: August 29, 2019) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Courtney Johnson was re-sentenced on remand from this Court. In his prior 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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appeal, the panel ruled that the District Court erred in not explicitly resolving a disputed 
matter affecting his sentence.1 On remand, the District Court imposed the same sentence 
as it had before, which included forty-eight months’ imprisonment and a $50,000 fine. 
Johnson appeals the sentence, arguing that the District Court erred in two respects: first, 
in finding that he was the manager of “otherwise extensive” criminal activity and 
applying an aggravating role enhancement; and second, in re-imposing the $50,000 fine 
without reassessing his ability to pay. We will affirm.2  
The District Court did not clearly err in finding Johnson’s criminal activity 
“otherwise extensive,”3 meaning there were “a total of five or more participants and 
countable non-participants.”4 Countable non-participants are those “whom the defendant 
                                              
1 United States v. Johnson, 682 F. App’x 118, 124 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding the 
District Court erred in failing to resolve a dispute about the loss associated with 
Johnson’s preparation of false tax returns). 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review findings of fact for clear error. United States v. 
Huynh, 884 F.3d 160, 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2018). We review unpreserved issues for plain 
error, asking whether there is “(1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial 
rights; and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Paladino, 769 F.3d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting United States v. Tai, 750 F.3d 309, 313–14 (3d Cir. 2014)). 
3 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The Government argues this issue is moot because Johnson 
has completed his prison term. Our review of this jurisdictional question is plenary. State 
Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Cty. of Camden, 824 F.3d 399, 404 (3d Cir. 2016). The issue is not moot 
because the “otherwise extensive” finding affects Johnson’s offense level, which is the 
starting point for setting his fine under U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3). Therefore, he stands to 
benefit from a favorable decision. See United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 237 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)).  
4 Huynh, 884 F.3d at 171.  
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employed with specific criminal intent for services that were peculiar and necessary to 
the scheme.”5 When a District Court’s participants-and-countable-non-participants 
analysis is not explicit, we may affirm where “specific factual findings, viewed in light of 
the entire record,” show the determination was not clearly erroneous.6 
The District Court counted Johnson and his wife as participants and counted as 
non-participants: “staff persons” at the Johnsons’ tax prep business “whose assistance 
and participation made it all possible;” the “Santa Barbara . . . connection;” Errol 
Walters; and Johnson’s taxpayer clients.7 Having identified those persons, the District 
Court found Johnson’s activity “otherwise extensive.” The record supports that finding. 
At trial, Johnson testified that five of his employees prepared returns and that he had to 
rely on them because he “ha[d] too much stuff to do to be doing returns.”8 Johnson’s 
clients testified that fraudulent returns had been filed using Walters’s Electronic Filing 
Identification Number (EFIN). Because this record supports the “otherwise extensive” 
finding the District Court did not clearly err.9   
                                              
5 Id. (citing United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 248 (3d Cir. 2000)).  
6 Id. at 171-72. 
7 App. 36-37, 46.  
8 Supp. App. 997, 1248. On appeal, Johnson argues there was no evidence that his 
staff prepared Schedule C’s—one of the forms used to perpetrate the fraud—but Johnson 
did in fact testify that his staff prepared Schedule C’s with his oversight. Id. at 1124-25.  
9 We need only consider Johnson’s employees and Walters to determine that there 
was no clear error. Therefore, we do not decide whether the District Court clearly erred 
when it also included Santa Barbara Bank & Trust and Johnson’s taxpayer clients—the 
victims—as countable non-participants.  
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 With regard to Johnson’s second argument, the District Court did not plainly err in 
re-imposing a $50,000 fine. Our review is for plain error because Johnson admittedly 
failed to raise this issue in the District Court.10 Johnson takes no umbrage at the ability-
to-pay determination at his first sentencing. At that time, he had significant debts, and the 
District Court based its finding largely on his future earning capacity. The Court imposed 
the fine without interest and decided against prohibiting Johnson from working in 
accounting in light of his “need to pay his obligations to the court.”11 Johnson argues that, 
on remand, his circumstances had obviously and materially changed: at the time of his 
first sentencing he did not qualify for appointed counsel, but by his re-sentencing he was 
represented by the Federal Public Defender, and he had obviously been unemployed due 
to his incarceration.  
Johnson’s qualification for appointed counsel neither forecloses the imposition of 
a fine nor obviously impacts future earning potential,12 so we cannot say that the need for 
a new ability-to-pay finding would have been obvious to the District Court, particularly 
in light of Johnson’s burden to present evidence on this issue.13 Further, Johnson has not 
                                              
10 See Gov’t of V.I. v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2005). Because we 
conclude that the District Court did not plainly err, we assume without deciding that 
Johnson did not affirmatively waive this issue. See id. (explaining that forfeiture permits 
plain error review while waiver does not).  
11 Supp. App. 1703.  
12 See United States v. Logar, 975 F.2d 958, 962 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[I]ndigency at 
the time of sentencing is not a bar to ordering a defendant to pay restitution in the 
future.”).  
13 United States v. Kadonsky, 242 F.3d 516, 520 (3d Cir. 2001).  
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explained how such an error affected his substantial rights.  
 Because the District Court properly calculated Johnson’s offense level and did not 
plainly err in re-imposing a $50,000 fine, we will affirm.  
